Friday, July 1, 2016

ACA Round-Up: Premium Stabilization Programs, Effectuated Enrollment, And More

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On June 30, CMS announced the results for the second year (2015) of the operation of the reinsurance and risk adjustment programs, two of the Affordable Care Act’s “three R” premium stabilization programs. The 2015 results from the third program, the risk corridor program, will be announced later this summer.

The ACA’s three R programs were modeled after similar premium stabilization programs that have operated for about a decade for Medicare Part D prescription drug plans: The Part D program also has a risk adjustment program (which adjusts premiums prospectively rather than insurer income retrospectively), a reinsurance program (which is much more generous than the ACA program and permanent rather than temporary), and a risk corridor program (also permanent, and initially more generous than the ACA program.). The part D premium stabilization programs played an important role in attracting insurers to the prescription drug program initially and have helped to keep premiums stable and premium increases low since the program was launched in 2006. They have undoubtedly been an important factor in maintaining the popularity and bipartisan support for Part D.

The ACA premium stabilization programs have proven far more controversial than the Part D programs. The risk corridor program has been criticized as an Insurer “bail-out” and was seriously undermined by legislation enacted by Congress in the program’s first year of operation making the risk corridors revenue neutral—that is, limiting program payouts to the amount collected from insurers. For 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services was only able to pay out 12.6 percent of the amounts owed insurers under the statutory formula because of this constraint. This no doubt contributed to the insolvency of a number of insurers and has resulted in a number of lawsuits, as insurers attempt to collect the full amount they claim they are due under the statute.

The reinsurance program has so far been able to pay insurers the full amount owing under implementing regulations. However, it has only done so by prioritizing the reinsurance function of the program and directing the fees collected under the program—which have fallen short of projections—to reinsurance rather than to the Treasury, which was supposed to collect $5 billion from the program over its three-year life. This has provoked criticism from ACA opponents, who claim that the Treasury must share in funds collected under the program.

Finally, the formula used by the risk adjustment program to redistribute funds has been criticized as favoring large, established insurers and penalizing smaller and newer insurers. CMS has proposed changes to the risk adjustment program, some of which will be in effect for 2017.

In the midst of all of these controversies, the reinsurance program has made a substantial contribution to constraining marketplace premiums. During 2014, the reinsurance program reduced net claim costs an estimated 10 to 14 percent. The risk adjustment program has shifted funds from insurers that served lower risk populations to those that have taken on higher risk enrollees.

The federal risk adjustment program for 2015 covered non-grandfathered insurers in the individual and small group markets in every state except Massachusetts, which operated its own risk adjustment program. The reinsurance program covered non-grandfathered insurers in the individual market in every state except Connecticut, which operated its own reinsurance program (although Connecticut reinsurance data is included in the CMS report).

Participating insurers were required to set up EDGE servers through which they could transfer to CMS the data necessary to calculate reinsurance programs and risk adjustment information while retaining control of sensitive enrollee information. Nationally, 575 insurers participated in the reinsurance program, of which 574 successfully submitted the EDGE server data necessary to compute payments. A total of 821 participated in the risk adjustment program of which 817 successfully submitted EDGE server data. Four insurers were subjected to the risk adjustment default charge for failing to submit or properly submit EDGE server data.

It is estimated at this point that the reinsurance program will pay out about $7.8 billion for the 2015 benefit year. CMS has already announced that it will pay out 55.1 cents on the dollar to insurers for claims between $45,000 and $250,000 for 2015. HHS has collected approximately $5.5 billion in reinsurance contributions for 2015 and expects to collect about another $1 billion. Since reinsurance contributions for 2015 were limited to $6 billion, CMS expects to send a half billion minus administrative expenses to the Treasury. CMS had about $1.7 billion in reinsurance contributions from 2014 available for 2015, which will also be spent for reinsurance in 2015.

The reinsurance payments listed in the report will be reduced by early reinsurance payments already made in March and April of 2016 and adjusted for “overlapping claims,” in which multiple claims were submitted for the same inpatient services, and for differences in projected and actual collections, discrepancies, and appeals. About 89 percent of reinsurance payments have been or will be paid out now with the remaining amount paid out once collections are finalized.

Of the 817 issuers participating in the risk adjustment program, 531 have individual non-catastrophic plans, 308 individual catastrophic plans, and 652 small group plans. Risk adjustment transfers (calculated using the absolute value of net transfers for each issuer) amounted to 10 percent of enrollment-weighted monthly premiums in the individual market, 6 percent in the small group market, and 18 percent in the catastrophic market, for a national average of 8 percent.

CMS reports that a strong correlation exists between paid claims and risk scores. Ninety-five percent of insurers in the lowest quartile of claims costs were also in the lowest quartile of plan liability risk scores, while 93 percent of insurers in the highest quartile of claims costs were also in the highest quartile of risk scores. Insurers in the lowest quartile of claims costs were assessed on average 12 percent of their premiums for risk adjustment, while those in the highest quartile received on average 11 percent of premium in payments.

Small and large insurers received similar risk adjustment transfers on average, but there was much greater dispersion among small insurers. Risk scores increased by less than 4 percent from 2014 to 2015, less than HHS expected given that in the second year of the program enrollees tended to be enrolled for longer periods of time, leading to more reported diagnoses; cross-year claims became possible for the first time; and insurers became more experienced in coding to capture diagnoses for risk adjustment payments.

Risk adjustment payments will be sequestered at a rate of 7 percent and reinsurance payments at a rate of 6.8 percent for payments made from FY 2016 funds because of governing budget sequestration requirements. CMS hopes that these funds will become available for payment in FY 2017 if Congress takes no further action.

Among the largest recipients of reinsurance payments were Blue Cross of California ($325 million); Kaiser Foundation of California ($194 million); Blue Shield of California ($282 million); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida ($204 million); Humana of Florida ($137 million); Humana of Georgia ($214 million); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois ($283 million); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota ($126 million), Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina ($223 million); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Tennessee ($125 million); and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas ($637 million).

Among the biggest recipients of risk adjustment payments in the individual market were Blue Shield of California ($182 million); Health Net of California ($126 million); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida ($369 million); and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan. Among the biggest payers into the program in the individual market were Kaiser Foundation of California ($82 million); Humana Medical Plans of Florida ($135 million); Molina of Florida ($219 million); and Coventry of Florida ($111 million). Among the biggest contributors in the small group market were Kaiser of California ($87 million); Aetna of New York ($93 million); and the Freelancers of New York ($154 million).

Most of the surviving CO-OPs, which have been very critical of the risk adjustment program, had to pay into it, some by quite sizeable amounts (Land of Lincoln Health, $32 million; Evergreen Health Cooperative, $24 million; Freelancers CO-OP of New Jersey, $46 million).

Effectuated Enrollment Report For The First Quarter Of 2016

On June 30, CMS also released its first quarter effectuated enrollment report for 2016. As of March 31, about 11.1 million consumers had paid their first-month premium and had retained active effectuated coverage through the federally facilitated and state-based marketplaces. About 8.4 million were enrolled through the 38 states served by the federally facilitated marketplace (FFM) and 2.7 million were enrolled through the remaining state-based marketplaces. This equaled 87 percent of the 12.7 million consumers who made plan selections during the 2016 open enrollment period—a respectable retention rate given the fact that enrollees in the individual insurance market routinely move out of that market into employer-sponsored insurance, Medicaid, or Medicare.

Approximately 85 percent of the enrollees (9.4 million) received advance premium tax credits, while 57 percent (6.4 million) received cost-sharing reduction payments. Nine of the ten states with the highest percentage of APTC recipients were states that Obama lost in 2012, while nine of the ten states with the lowest percentages of APTC recipients are states he carried (although this is largely an artifact of Republican states tending not to expand Medicaid and thus having more low-income individuals receiving tax credits).

On average, marketplace enrollees received $291 a month in APTC, with average APTC amounts ranging from a high average of $750 per month in Alaska to a low average of $178 per month in New York (which has a basic health plan and thus fewer low-income individuals with APTC).

Less than half a percent of enrollees were in catastrophic plans, 22 percent in bronze, 70 percent in silver, 6 percent in gold, and 2 percent in platinum. The high level of silver enrollments reflects the fact that an enrollee must be enrolled in a silver plan to receive APTC.

The effectuated enrollment report also includes information on data matching and special enrollment periods. Individuals who enroll in marketplace coverage must provide documentary evidence of their citizenship or immigration status if it cannot be verified through electronic records. Individuals who apply for financial assistance must also document their annual household income if it cannot be verified electronically. Citizenship and immigration issues must be resolved within 95 days of application or the applicant’s enrollment will be terminated. Income inconsistencies must be resolved within 90 days or financial assistance will be recomputed.

During the January 1 to March 31, 2016 period, data matching issues were dramatically reduced over the prior year. Only 17,000 individuals had enrollment terminated in the FFM because of unresolved citizenship or immigration issues, an 85 percent decrease compared to the first quarter of 2015. About 73,000 households had their APTC or CSRs adjusted, a 69 percent decrease from 2015.

Consumers who do not sign up for coverage during the annual open enrollment period but meet specific criteria can enroll during special enrollment periods (SEPs). There have been allegations in recent months that ineligible consumers have been enrolling in coverage improperly by claiming that they qualify for an SEP. CMS has as of June 17 begun to require applicants to produce documentation to establish eligibility for SEP enrollment.

The enrollment effectuation report includes a special addendum with the first detailed information CMS has released on SEP enrollments. In 2015, 1.6 million individuals who did not select a plan during open enrollment enrolled through an SEP. (An undisclosed number of individuals who did enroll during open enrollment also were able to change plans through an SEP because of a life change).

Sixty percent of these received an SEP because of loss of other minimum essential coverage. Eighteen percent had initially applied during open enrollment period but had to receive a Medicaid eligibility determination before they could enroll (through an SEP) for marketplace coverage and financial assistance. Nine percent enrolled through the 2015-only tax SEP for those who were unaware that they were subject to the individual responsibility requirement until they filed their 2014 taxes.

Of the remaining SEP enrollees, about 58,000, or 3.6 percent were granted an SEP because they had moved to a new service area, while fewer than 15,000 thousand (less than 1 percent) received an SEP because of marriage, and about 34,000 (2 percent) received an SEP because they had a baby or adopted a child. Given that 12 percent of Americans move each year and that the individual market has always been subject to “churn,” these numbers and percentages do not seem exceptionally high.

Up to this point, CMS has been releasing quarterly effectuated enrollment snapshots. In the future, it intends to release semiannual effectuated enrollment reports based on average enrollments during the relevant time period, one for the first six months of the year and another for the full twelve months.

Insurer Repayment Of Cost-Sharing Reduction Overpayments

On June 27, CMS released an FAQ stating that insurers that had received overpayments for cost-sharing reduction payments and could not immediately repay the amount owed could request flexibility to set up a payment schedule. The FAQ explains what insurers would have to do to schedule repayment.

If full repayment would present a liquidity hardship for an insurer but the company expects to remain solvent through the end of 2016 and does not have reasonable access to another source of funding, the insurer must request a repayment schedule from CMS by Tuesday, July 5. It must provide financial data regarding its monthly projection of cash balances, monthly projection of risk-based capital percentage, and annual projected expenses. It must inform the department of insurance of the state in which it is domiciled that it is requesting flexibility. It must also submit an attestation as to each of the eligibility factors listed above, the accuracy of the financial data submitted, and its understanding that it will have to pay interest on the debt.

Navigators and Certified Application Counselor Training And Certification

On June 28, 2016, CMS released a Guidance Regarding Training, Certification, and Recertification for Navigators and Certified Application Counselors in the Federally Facilitated Marketplaces. All staff and volunteers of FFM navigator grantees who perform navigator functions must complete navigator training and pass an exam before they can be certified and carry out navigator responsibilities. New navigators must pass the 2017 navigator training program. Navigators who were certified during the 2015-2016 budget period, have not been decertified, and are still affiliated with the same navigator grantee organizations may take an abbreviated 2017 navigator training course. Navigators who are affiliated with a different navigator organization than the one they served in 2015-2016 will have to complete the entire new training course.

Individuals who seek certification application counselor status for 2017 must complete the full CAC training course. There is no abbreviated training course for CACs. CMS estimates that it will take five to ten hours to complete the CAC training and about twenty hours to complete navigator training. CACs are certified not by CMS but by the CAC designated organizations (CDOs) with which they are affiliated. CDOs are not required to provide to CMS the names of CACs that they certify unless they are requested to do so. CDOs that have an agreement with CMS from 2016 are not required to enter into a new agreement for 2017, as agreements renew from year to year automatically.

No-Cost Extensions Of Exchange Establishment Grants To States

Section 1311(a) of the Affordable Care Act authorized the Department of Health and Human Services to provide grants to the states for exchange planning and establishment activities. The cut-off date for awarding initial establishment grants was January 1, 2015. Prior to that date, HHS awarded states about $5.5 billion dollars in grants,

On June 29, CMS issued a guidance instructing states as to how to request no-cost extensions for 2017 of establishment grants they have already been awarded. In accordance with its usual grants policies, CMS will consider granting state awardees a no-cost extension of up to one year if the extension will not extend the initial grant period beyond five years from the initial award date.

Grantees must demonstrate that an extension is reasonably necessary for them to complete establishment activities approved under the grantee’s original work plan and provide an account for progress made during previous extensions. Applicants must also show a direct correlation between the activities that must still be completed and the amount of additional time requested. Establishment grant funds may only be used for planning and establishment purposes, such as creation of information technology systems and establishment of consumer outreach programs, and may not be used for maintenance and operating purposes.

Civil Money Penalties

The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015 requires federal agencies to adjust the level of civil money penalties that agencies may impose with an initial catch-up inflation adjustment, followed by annual inflation adjustments. On June 30, the Department of Labor released an interim final rule with comment period proposing catch-up adjustments for some of the civil money penalties imposed by the Department.

These include a number of health coverage related penalties. For example, per beneficiary, per day penalties imposed on group health plans and insurers for failure to comply with prohibitions against pre-existing condition exclusions or health status discrimination, or prohibitions involving genetic testing and information, are increased from $100 to $110. The penalty for failing to provide a summary of benefits and coverage when required is increased from $1,000 to $1,087. The increases are effective August 1, 2016.



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When Common Sense And Public Health Prevail: Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt

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On June 27, 2016 the United States Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Whole Women's Health et al. v. Hellerstedt, one of its culminating decisions for the 2015-2016 term. By a 5-3 majority, the Court ruled unconstitutional two specific provisions of a Texas statute (House Bill 2), which was enacted in 2013 following a dramatic debate that featured a national headline-making filibuster by State Senator Wendy Davis.

The two provisions at issue were first, a requirement that physicians performing surgical or medical abortions have active admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles, and second, that clinics performing previability abortions meet extensive licensure standards applicable to ambulatory surgical facilities. Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion on behalf of himself and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a brief, separate concurrence. Justice Alito dissented on behalf of himself, Justice Thomas, and the Chief Justice, while Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissent. The high court's ruling overturned a decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upholding the statutory provisions.

The majority opinion represents a full-throated reaffirmation of the balancing test first set forth by the Court 25 years ago in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern United States v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). That test calls for careful judicial review of abortion-related legislation whose stated purpose may be to protect women's health but is allegedly unnecessary, has "the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion," and thereby "impose[s] an undue burden" on the right to abortion. (Slip op. at 1)

In her concurrence Justice Ginsburg stated that "it is beyond rational belief" that the Texas law possibly could be regarded as protecting women when its impact was so obviously to reduce access to safe abortions. But rather than rely on common-sense alone, Justice Breyer did a masterful job of demolishing the state's arguments, using the extensive legal record established at trial. Indeed, the record itself underscored just how far astray the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit went in placing procedural roadblocks in the way of the legal challenge and ignoring the Casey standard of review and the powerful record.

Texas is not alone in having applied hospital privilege and ambulatory surgical center requirements to abortion providers. According to the Guttmacher Institute, as of March 2016, five states maintained laws requiring physicians performing abortions to have active admitting privileges at area hospitals, and 22 states had ambulatory surgical center requirements. Although only the Texas law was before the Court, it is likely that these state laws will be overturned as well.

However, experts caution that this is hardly the end of aggressive state efforts to use the legislative process to impede abortion access, for example by restricting access to medication abortions or bans on certain types of surgical abortions. Indeed, the pace of state lawmaking aimed at curbing women's ability to obtain safe and legal abortions has been breathtaking: Between 2011 and 2015 alone, states enacted 288 laws running the full gamut of strategies to restrict abortion access.

It is worth remembering that Texas' efforts to bar abortion access coincided with its aggressive actions to curb access to contraception to disadvantaged and medically underserved women. Rather than permitting Planned Parenthood to participate as a Medicaid provider as it is required to do under federal Medicaid law, Texas eliminated its expanded Medicaid family planning eligibility program. The state also excluded Planned Parenthood from its state-funded program, an action associated with diminished access to the most effective forms of contraception among lower income women and an increase in the number of Medicaid births.

The Challenge to Texas H.B. 2 — Trial and Appeal

Within weeks of H.B. 2's enactment became law, Texas clinics brought what is known as a facial challenge—an allegation that a law is always unconstitutional, as opposed to an allegation that a particular application of the law is unconstitutional — to halt the two provisions before they could be implemented. A federal court in Texas issued an injunction, which was then vacated by the Fifth Circuit, which proceeded to uphold the legality of the legislative provisions. In so doing, the appeals court deferred to the state's claims that its laws would reduce health risks associated with medical complications from abortion and performance of abortions by "untrained or incompetent" abortion providers. The appeals court also cited insufficient evidence that the clinics could not comply with the admitting privileges requirement and concluded that in major Texas cities, securing privileges either did or would pose no problem.

One week after this decision, clinics from McAllen and El Paso filed a separate suit to stop enforcement of the admitting privileges law against them specifically. They also challenged enforcement of the surgical center requirement anywhere in Texas. Following an extended trial, a second federal trial court concluded that the effect of H.B. 2 would have a massive impact on abortion access and could not be justified as a law whose benefits outweighed its harms. The court found that the laws would nearly halve the number of licensed and operational abortion clinics in Texas.

The court also found that given the number of women of reproductive age and the fairly constant rate of abortion in the state, the remaining clinics could not possibly absorb the enormous impact of the loss of clinic capacity. Finally the court determined that were the two laws to take effect, about 2 million of the state's 5.4 million women of childbearing age would live at least 50 miles from a licensed abortion clinic, and that 750,000 would live over 200 miles from an abortion provider. According to the trial evidence, the burden fell particularly hard on rural and disadvantaged women.

The trial court further found that the laws contributed virtually nothing to health care safety for women undergoing an abortion. The evidence showed that abortion was extremely safe, overwhelmingly devoid of complications, and with "virtually no deaths occurring on account of the procedure." Indeed, the court found, abortion was far safer than other procedures "not subject to such intense regulation and scrutiny." Additionally, whatever the abortion risks might be, requiring a previability abortion to be performed at a licensed ambulatory surgical center made it no safer.

Indeed, the evidence showed that the ambulatory surgery center standards themselves were rarely applied, even for higher-risk procedures. The evidence showed that Texas either had routinely waived its ambulatory surgery center standards or else had grandfathered in non-compliant centers. The court found that the evidence showed that the expected cost of coming into compliance with surgical center requirements could exceed a million dollars for existing clinics, with the cost of building a new clinic exceeding three million dollars.

On the basis of this record, the District Court enjoined enforcement of the laws.

The state appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which stayed the trial court order. (The Supreme Court vacated this stay, meaning that the District Court injunction remained in effect during the appeal). In June 2015, however, the Fifth Circuit overturned the trial court on both procedural and merits-related grounds. On the procedural front, the appeals court held that certain claims could have been brought in the first action, the facial challenge to the H.B. 2 provisions, and therefore the principle of res judicata precluded re-litigating the same issues.

On the merits, the appeals court veered from the Casey balancing test, ruling that it was enough (as it is when fundamental constitutional rights are not at issue) that the state offered a legitimate and rational basis for its actions (protecting women's health) and therefore that no further consideration was needed. As far as the Fifth Circuit was concerned, witnesses testifying to the adverse impact of the two laws offered speculative evidence at best regarding the ability of the surviving seven or eight clinics to meet statewide needs. As far as the women in El Paso were concerned, where the only clinic would be gone, the appeals court concluded that they could travel to New Mexico for care.

The Majority Opinion

Disposing of the procedural hurdles

Justice Breyer began, as courts must, by resolving the preliminary question of whether the plaintiffs' claims were barred by res judicata principles. He concluded that the lower court had erred in this respect, since a challenge to laws on their face is very different from the changed circumstances that arise when laws are actually applied as part of an implementation and enforcement scheme. He noted that this is particularly true in situations such as this one, in which fundamental constitutional rights are at stake and the full contours of a law become clearer only when actual enforcement begins. Thus the problem of "claim preclusion" applied to neither the admitting privilege rule nor the ambulatory surgical center requirement.

The undue burden standard

Justice Breyer then turned to the correct standard to be applied to the case. Whereas the appeals court had shown deference to the judgment of the legislature regarding when a regulatory law is medically appropriate, Justice Breyer made clear that under Casey, it is the courts—not the legislature—that must balance the burdens created by a law against its benefits. Lesser scrutiny, he noted, is the proper standard in economic claims. But where "constitutionally protected liberty" is involved the standard shifts, and under Casey, the standard becomes whether "any burden imposed on abortion is 'undue'". (Slip. op. at 20)

In an abortion case, Breyer noted, courts are required to place "considerable weight upon evidence and argument" because under Casey, the "Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake." (Slip op. at 20) Abortion statutes are not to be upheld based on "uncritical deference to [legislative] factual findings." (Slip op. at 21). Rather than substituting its own judgment for that of lawmakers, the trial court in fact considered the evidence in the record and then "weighed the asserted benefits against the burdens." In so doing, the trial court followed the law.

The undue burden created by the admitting privilege requirement

Prior to H.B. 2, a physician furnishing abortions was required either to have admitting privileges at a local hospital or a working arrangement with one who did. The law eliminated the working arrangement option and instead required active privileges. Finding adequate legal and factual support for the trial court's holding that the requirement posed an undue burden, Justice Breyer concluded that the admitting privilege rule did nothing to advance its stated purpose of making abortions safer should complications arise. The evidence shows that the rate of first trimester abortion complications is less than 0.25 percent; even during second trimester abortions, the complication rate rises to only 0.5 percent.

Furthermore, such complications rarely require hospitalization or immediate transfer from a clinic. Indeed, in the rare event of a complication, the evidence at trial showed that problems arise days after the abortion is performed, not during or immediately afterward. In these situations, the record showed, patients will seek help close to home, not where they obtained the abortion.

Although nothing in the record suggested that a shift to requiring privileges (as opposed to a working arrangement) improved care for any woman, there was ample evidence that the requirement created substantial obstacles. At the time enforcement began, the number of licensed operating clinics dropped by half, from about 40 to about 20; 11 clinics closed on the day the admitting privileges rule took effect. In numerous communities, no physician with admitting privileges at a local hospital who also would provide abortions could be found.

Furthermore, evidence showed that hospitals would be unwilling to extend privileges to physicians performing abortions, since qualifying for privileges depends in good part on the business a physician can generate for a hospital; because it is safe with virtually no complications, abortion practice generates virtually none. Similarly, other hospitals limit privileges to physicians with faculty appointments. Evidence presented at trial also suggested unwillingness on the part of hospitals to extend privileges to physicians who performed abortions, even when their obstetrical and gynecological practice was recognized as highly clinically competent. (Slip op. at 25).

For the majority, the record showed that the admitting privileges requirement "led to the closure of half of Texas' clinics or thereabouts. These closures meant fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding" (Slip op. at 20), with hundreds of thousands of women left without a clinic within 150 miles or more. Noting the dissent's argument that the fact that "some" clinics closed because of the rules did not mean that all of the closures could be ascribed to the law, and therefore that an undue burden was not shown, Justice Breyer countered that the trial court record was sound and that the dissent was simply speculating regarding the existence of possible other causes, none of which were proven at trial.

Justice Breyer also pushed back on the dissent's assertion that the Texas law was enacted in response to the case of Kermit Gosnell, a Pennsylvania physician whose gross violations of health and safety laws pertaining to abortion clinics led to convictions for first-degree murder and manslaughter. Breyer pointed out that while Gosnell's clinic went uninspected for 15 years, Texas law even before H.B. 2 was actively enforced.

The undue burden created by the surgical center requirement

Turning to the ambulatory surgical center requirement, Justice Breyer noted the extensive applicable regulatory provisions that already applied to abortion clinics at the time of passage of H.B. 2. These covered quality assurance, personnel staffing and policies, physical and environmental requirements, infection control, disclosure requirements, patient rights, medical and clinical requirements, and anesthesia; they also called for random inspections and civil and criminal penalties for their violation.

The ambulatory surgical facility standards upped the ante considerably, since facilities had to be designed to manage complex surgeries in a non-hospital location. To be licensed as an ambulatory surgical center, clinics had to meet extensive requirements applicable to buildings in which advanced operations occurred, a level of care that vastly surpasses what happens in an abortion clinic geared to perform previability abortions. The trial record contained considerable evidence showing that the application of ambulatory surgical standards to abortion clinics did nothing to benefit patients and was "not necessary." (Slip op. at 29-30).

According to Justice Breyer, the record was clear that being an ambulatory surgical center means nothing when complication arises as a result of a medical abortion, since in these cases, complications set in only after patients leave the facility. Furthermore, he noted, the record showed that existing abortion facilities were safe, with virtually no deaths attributable to abortion in Texas. By comparison, childbirth carried 14 times the risk of death. (Slip op. at 30). In sum, the ambulatory surgical center requirements were either without benefit to the health and safety of an abortion procedure or in some cases actually undermined safety by creating conditions that themselves raised certain risks. As such, the trial record provided ample evidence that the requirement lacked medical necessity justification.

This finding, Justice Breyer continued, was in sharp contrast to the evidence at trial regarding the substantial obstacles in the way of abortion created by the requirement. Only seven to eight facilities located in major urban areas across the state could survive such a requirement, and the notion that these seven to eight facilities could meet statewide demand "stretches credulity," in the words of the trial court. (Slip op. at 32). Based on statistical estimates, this handful of facilities would have to increase their capacity from 14,000 abortions annually to between 60,000 and 70,000 (Slip op. at 32-33). The dissenters insisted that these expert estimates presented at trial were purely speculative and there was no evidence that the clinics were already operating at capacity; in response, Justice Breyer noted that the trial court could base its inference on common sense, especially since the state offered no rebuttal evidence to support its claim that the remaining clinics could vastly ramp up their capacity. He concluded this way:

More fundamentally, in the face of no threat to women's health, Texas seeks to force women to travel long distances to get abortions in crammed-to-capacity superfacilities. Patients seeking these services are less likely to get the kind of individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support that doctors at less taxed facilities may have offered. Health care facilities and medical professionals are not fungible commodities.

(Slip op. at 35-36)

The majority went on to reject Texas' other arguments. The state insisted that the Court invalidate only specific applications of H.B. 2 rather than the provisions on their face; Justice Breyer's response was that the record in the case was so strong and showed such a statewide impact that there was essentially no application of the law that could survive. The provisions were facially invalid despite the state's protest about the need for a more surgical remedy.

Texas also insisted that the Court go element by element through the ambulatory surgical center rule to identify which particular elements crossed the line and which could survive. To this argument Justice Breyer made clear that the surgical center standard was intended to operate as a whole as an "integrated" standard and that, therefore, no parsing was necessary. The state also attempted to argue that past decisions by the Court have upheld surgical center requirements for second trimester abortions (Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983)), but Justice Breyer noted that here the state had restricted all abortions, not only those occurring later in pregnancy. Justice Breyer further noted that consistent with Casey, the undue burden test must be viewed through a previability/viability lens and that the trimester approach of Roe v. Wade no longer applies.

Finally, the state argued that only a tiny number of women were affected and therefore the law created no undue burden. But, Justice Breyer responded that the state's count was off: Whereas the state considered all women of reproductive age, the proper group was women actually seeking an abortion. It is women for whom the laws create an actual restriction whose interests are considered.

The Ginsburg Concurrence

Justice Ginsburg, one of the nation's preeminent legal experts on gender discrimination, reiterated the extremely safe nature of abortions, particularly in relation to childbirth, as well as her amazement that anyone could really argue (or believe) that the Texas law was enacted out of concern for women's health:

When a State severely limits access to safe and legal procedures, women in desperate circumstances may resort to unlicensed rogue practitioners, faute d mieux, at great risk to their health and safety. So long as this Court adheres to Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers laws like H.B. 2 that do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to abortion . . . cannot survive judicial inspection.

(Ginsburg concurrence, Slip op. at 2)

The Dissents

For their part, the dissenters homed in on what they viewed as procedural irregularities and a distortion of the record. In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the Court treated the case as a fundamental rights case when, in fact, the plaintiffs in the case were licensed clinics with economic interests and therefore did not qualify for the heightened scrutiny standard applied to cases brought by women themselves. (This was also true in Casey, where the Court first set forth its heightened scrutiny standard.) Justice Thomas would have barred the vicarious assertion of personal rights, noting that the Court has been "especially forgiving of third-party standing criteria for one particular category of cases: those involving the purported substantive due process right of a woman to abort her unborn child." (Thomas dissent, Slip. op. at 4). (The Court has long recognized the ability to raise vicarious claims on behalf of individuals whose own injuries may evade review with the passage of time.)

Justice Thomas also accused the majority of "reimagin[ing]" the Casey "undue burden" standard, arguing that the majority had overstated the extent to which Casey bars states from engaging in legitimate health regulation without close judicial scrutiny and accusing the Court of getting the political result it sought by shifting to the higher review standard. Justice Thomas concluded by castigating the Court for ever having "invent[ed]" a constitutional right to abortion.

In his dissent, Justice Alito began by noting that "[t]he constitutionality of laws regulating abortion is one of the most controversial issues in American law, but this case does not require us to delve into that contentious dispute. Instead the dispositive issue here concerns a workaday question that can arise in any case no matter the subject," (Alito dissent, slip op. at 1) namely whether the claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Rather than arguing the evidence in this case, or the merits of the Casey framework for judicial review, or whether the framework was properly followed, or even the underlying right to abortion itself, he would simply have thrown the case out.

Beyond his argument for dismissal of the claims, Justice Alito went on to dismiss the evidence in the trial record as insufficient to make out the claims of undue burden, arguing essentially that once the plaintiffs got their erroneous second day in court, they failed to carry the day with the evidence they presented. His biggest concern appeared to be with the evidence of causation or lack thereof. From Justice Alito's perspective, laws may have passed and clinics may have closed, but the plaintiffs could show no causal link between the two, nor was there any convincing evidence that the remaining clinics could not reasonably meet the need. The lack of causation, coupled with the deference owed to states over the regulation of medical practice, tipped the results decisively, for Alito, toward a finding that the Casey test was satisfied.

For now, Casey stands. Five of the sitting Justices have affirmed the continuing validity of its approach to judicial review of legal restrictions on access to abortion. One Justice would indisputably set the test (and the underlying right) aside, while the remaining two clearly are inclined in that direction, although a bit more ambiguous in how they make their case. And once again we are reminded that there is no stronger poster child than abortion for the proposition that Presidential elections—that bring with them the right to recommend individuals for appointment to the federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court—matter.



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When Common Sense And Public Health Prevail: Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt

Blog_WholeHealthvHellerstedt

On June 27, 2016 the United States Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Whole Women’s Health et al. v. Hellerstedt, one of its culminating decisions for the 2015-2016 term. By a 5-3 majority, the Court ruled unconstitutional two specific provisions of a Texas statute (House Bill 2), which was enacted in 2013 following a dramatic debate that featured a national headline-making filibuster by State Senator Wendy Davis.

The two provisions at issue were first, a requirement that physicians performing surgical or medical abortions have active admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles, and second, that clinics performing previability abortions meet extensive licensure standards applicable to ambulatory surgical facilities. Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion on behalf of himself and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a brief, separate concurrence. Justice Alito dissented on behalf of himself, Justice Thomas, and the Chief Justice, while Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissent. The high court’s ruling overturned a decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upholding the statutory provisions.

The majority opinion represents a full-throated reaffirmation of the balancing test first set forth by the Court 25 years ago in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern United States v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). That test calls for careful judicial review of abortion-related legislation whose stated purpose may be to protect women’s health but is allegedly unnecessary, has “the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion,” and thereby “impose[s] an undue burden” on the right to abortion. (Slip op. at 1)

In her concurrence Justice Ginsburg stated that “it is beyond rational belief” that the Texas law possibly could be regarded as protecting women when its impact was so obviously to reduce access to safe abortions. But rather than rely on common-sense alone, Justice Breyer did a masterful job of demolishing the state’s arguments, using the extensive legal record established at trial. Indeed, the record itself underscored just how far astray the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit went in placing procedural roadblocks in the way of the legal challenge and ignoring the Casey standard of review and the powerful record.

Texas is not alone in having applied hospital privilege and ambulatory surgical center requirements to abortion providers. According to the Guttmacher Institute, as of March 2016, five states maintained laws requiring physicians performing abortions to have active admitting privileges at area hospitals, and 22 states had ambulatory surgical center requirements. Although only the Texas law was before the Court, it is likely that these state laws will be overturned as well.

However, experts caution that this is hardly the end of aggressive state efforts to use the legislative process to impede abortion access, for example by restricting access to medication abortions or bans on certain types of surgical abortions. Indeed, the pace of state lawmaking aimed at curbing women’s ability to obtain safe and legal abortions has been breathtaking: Between 2011 and 2015 alone, states enacted 288 laws running the full gamut of strategies to restrict abortion access.

It is worth remembering that Texas’ efforts to bar abortion access coincided with its aggressive actions to curb access to contraception to disadvantaged and medically underserved women. Rather than permitting Planned Parenthood to participate as a Medicaid provider as it is required to do under federal Medicaid law, Texas eliminated its expanded Medicaid family planning eligibility program. The state also excluded Planned Parenthood from its state-funded program, an action associated with diminished access to the most effective forms of contraception among lower income women and an increase in the number of Medicaid births.

The Challenge to Texas H.B. 2 — Trial and Appeal

Within weeks of H.B. 2’s enactment became law, Texas clinics brought what is known as a facial challenge—an allegation that a law is always unconstitutional, as opposed to an allegation that a particular application of the law is unconstitutional — to halt the two provisions before they could be implemented. A federal court in Texas issued an injunction, which was then vacated by the Fifth Circuit, which proceeded to uphold the legality of the legislative provisions. In so doing, the appeals court deferred to the state’s claims that its laws would reduce health risks associated with medical complications from abortion and performance of abortions by “untrained or incompetent” abortion providers. The appeals court also cited insufficient evidence that the clinics could not comply with the admitting privileges requirement and concluded that in major Texas cities, securing privileges either did or would pose no problem.

One week after this decision, clinics from McAllen and El Paso filed a separate suit to stop enforcement of the admitting privileges law against them specifically. They also challenged enforcement of the surgical center requirement anywhere in Texas. Following an extended trial, a second federal trial court concluded that the effect of H.B. 2 would have a massive impact on abortion access and could not be justified as a law whose benefits outweighed its harms. The court found that the laws would nearly halve the number of licensed and operational abortion clinics in Texas.

The court also found that given the number of women of reproductive age and the fairly constant rate of abortion in the state, the remaining clinics could not possibly absorb the enormous impact of the loss of clinic capacity. Finally the court determined that were the two laws to take effect, about 2 million of the state’s 5.4 million women of childbearing age would live at least 50 miles from a licensed abortion clinic, and that 750,000 would live over 200 miles from an abortion provider. According to the trial evidence, the burden fell particularly hard on rural and disadvantaged women.

The trial court further found that the laws contributed virtually nothing to health care safety for women undergoing an abortion. The evidence showed that abortion was extremely safe, overwhelmingly devoid of complications, and with “virtually no deaths occurring on account of the procedure.” Indeed, the court found, abortion was far safer than other procedures “not subject to such intense regulation and scrutiny.” Additionally, whatever the abortion risks might be, requiring a previability abortion to be performed at a licensed ambulatory surgical center made it no safer.

Indeed, the evidence showed that the ambulatory surgery center standards themselves were rarely applied, even for higher-risk procedures. The evidence showed that Texas either had routinely waived its ambulatory surgery center standards or else had grandfathered in non-compliant centers. The court found that the evidence showed that the expected cost of coming into compliance with surgical center requirements could exceed a million dollars for existing clinics, with the cost of building a new clinic exceeding three million dollars.

On the basis of this record, the District Court enjoined enforcement of the laws.

The state appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which stayed the trial court order. (The Supreme Court vacated this stay, meaning that the District Court injunction remained in effect during the appeal). In June 2015, however, the Fifth Circuit overturned the trial court on both procedural and merits-related grounds. On the procedural front, the appeals court held that certain claims could have been brought in the first action, the facial challenge to the H.B. 2 provisions, and therefore the principle of res judicata precluded re-litigating the same issues.

On the merits, the appeals court veered from the Casey balancing test, ruling that it was enough (as it is when fundamental constitutional rights are not at issue) that the state offered a legitimate and rational basis for its actions (protecting women’s health) and therefore that no further consideration was needed. As far as the Fifth Circuit was concerned, witnesses testifying to the adverse impact of the two laws offered speculative evidence at best regarding the ability of the surviving seven or eight clinics to meet statewide needs. As far as the women in El Paso were concerned, where the only clinic would be gone, the appeals court concluded that they could travel to New Mexico for care.

The Majority Opinion

Disposing of the procedural hurdles

Justice Breyer began, as courts must, by resolving the preliminary question of whether the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata principles. He concluded that the lower court had erred in this respect, since a challenge to laws on their face is very different from the changed circumstances that arise when laws are actually applied as part of an implementation and enforcement scheme. He noted that this is particularly true in situations such as this one, in which fundamental constitutional rights are at stake and the full contours of a law become clearer only when actual enforcement begins. Thus the problem of “claim preclusion” applied to neither the admitting privilege rule nor the ambulatory surgical center requirement.

The undue burden standard

Justice Breyer then turned to the correct standard to be applied to the case. Whereas the appeals court had shown deference to the judgment of the legislature regarding when a regulatory law is medically appropriate, Justice Breyer made clear that under Casey, it is the courts—not the legislature—that must balance the burdens created by a law against its benefits. Lesser scrutiny, he noted, is the proper standard in economic claims. But where “constitutionally protected liberty” is involved the standard shifts, and under Casey, the standard becomes whether “any burden imposed on abortion is ‘undue’”. (Slip. op. at 20)

In an abortion case, Breyer noted, courts are required to place “considerable weight upon evidence and argument” because under Casey, the “Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake.” (Slip op. at 20) Abortion statutes are not to be upheld based on “uncritical deference to [legislative] factual findings.” (Slip op. at 21). Rather than substituting its own judgment for that of lawmakers, the trial court in fact considered the evidence in the record and then “weighed the asserted benefits against the burdens.” In so doing, the trial court followed the law.

The undue burden created by the admitting privilege requirement

Prior to H.B. 2, a physician furnishing abortions was required either to have admitting privileges at a local hospital or a working arrangement with one who did. The law eliminated the working arrangement option and instead required active privileges. Finding adequate legal and factual support for the trial court’s holding that the requirement posed an undue burden, Justice Breyer concluded that the admitting privilege rule did nothing to advance its stated purpose of making abortions safer should complications arise. The evidence shows that the rate of first trimester abortion complications is less than 0.25 percent; even during second trimester abortions, the complication rate rises to only 0.5 percent.

Furthermore, such complications rarely require hospitalization or immediate transfer from a clinic. Indeed, in the rare event of a complication, the evidence at trial showed that problems arise days after the abortion is performed, not during or immediately afterward. In these situations, the record showed, patients will seek help close to home, not where they obtained the abortion.

Although nothing in the record suggested that a shift to requiring privileges (as opposed to a working arrangement) improved care for any woman, there was ample evidence that the requirement created substantial obstacles. At the time enforcement began, the number of licensed operating clinics dropped by half, from about 40 to about 20; 11 clinics closed on the day the admitting privileges rule took effect. In numerous communities, no physician with admitting privileges at a local hospital who also would provide abortions could be found.

Furthermore, evidence showed that hospitals would be unwilling to extend privileges to physicians performing abortions, since qualifying for privileges depends in good part on the business a physician can generate for a hospital; because it is safe with virtually no complications, abortion practice generates virtually none. Similarly, other hospitals limit privileges to physicians with faculty appointments. Evidence presented at trial also suggested unwillingness on the part of hospitals to extend privileges to physicians who performed abortions, even when their obstetrical and gynecological practice was recognized as highly clinically competent. (Slip op. at 25).

For the majority, the record showed that the admitting privileges requirement “led to the closure of half of Texas’ clinics or thereabouts. These closures meant fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding” (Slip op. at 20), with hundreds of thousands of women left without a clinic within 150 miles or more. Noting the dissent’s argument that the fact that “some” clinics closed because of the rules did not mean that all of the closures could be ascribed to the law, and therefore that an undue burden was not shown, Justice Breyer countered that the trial court record was sound and that the dissent was simply speculating regarding the existence of possible other causes, none of which were proven at trial.

Justice Breyer also pushed back on the dissent’s assertion that the Texas law was enacted in response to the case of Kermit Gosnell, a Pennsylvania physician whose gross violations of health and safety laws pertaining to abortion clinics led to convictions for first-degree murder and manslaughter. Breyer pointed out that while Gosnell’s clinic went uninspected for 15 years, Texas law even before H.B. 2 was actively enforced.

The undue burden created by the surgical center requirement

Turning to the ambulatory surgical center requirement, Justice Breyer noted the extensive applicable regulatory provisions that already applied to abortion clinics at the time of passage of H.B. 2. These covered quality assurance, personnel staffing and policies, physical and environmental requirements, infection control, disclosure requirements, patient rights, medical and clinical requirements, and anesthesia; they also called for random inspections and civil and criminal penalties for their violation.

The ambulatory surgical facility standards upped the ante considerably, since facilities had to be designed to manage complex surgeries in a non-hospital location. To be licensed as an ambulatory surgical center, clinics had to meet extensive requirements applicable to buildings in which advanced operations occurred, a level of care that vastly surpasses what happens in an abortion clinic geared to perform previability abortions. The trial record contained considerable evidence showing that the application of ambulatory surgical standards to abortion clinics did nothing to benefit patients and was “not necessary.” (Slip op. at 29-30).

According to Justice Breyer, the record was clear that being an ambulatory surgical center means nothing when complication arises as a result of a medical abortion, since in these cases, complications set in only after patients leave the facility. Furthermore, he noted, the record showed that existing abortion facilities were safe, with virtually no deaths attributable to abortion in Texas. By comparison, childbirth carried 14 times the risk of death. (Slip op. at 30). In sum, the ambulatory surgical center requirements were either without benefit to the health and safety of an abortion procedure or in some cases actually undermined safety by creating conditions that themselves raised certain risks. As such, the trial record provided ample evidence that the requirement lacked medical necessity justification.

This finding, Justice Breyer continued, was in sharp contrast to the evidence at trial regarding the substantial obstacles in the way of abortion created by the requirement. Only seven to eight facilities located in major urban areas across the state could survive such a requirement, and the notion that these seven to eight facilities could meet statewide demand “stretches credulity,” in the words of the trial court. (Slip op. at 32). Based on statistical estimates, this handful of facilities would have to increase their capacity from 14,000 abortions annually to between 60,000 and 70,000 (Slip op. at 32-33). The dissenters insisted that these expert estimates presented at trial were purely speculative and there was no evidence that the clinics were already operating at capacity; in response, Justice Breyer noted that the trial court could base its inference on common sense, especially since the state offered no rebuttal evidence to support its claim that the remaining clinics could vastly ramp up their capacity. He concluded this way:

More fundamentally, in the face of no threat to women’s health, Texas seeks to force women to travel long distances to get abortions in crammed-to-capacity superfacilities. Patients seeking these services are less likely to get the kind of individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support that doctors at less taxed facilities may have offered. Health care facilities and medical professionals are not fungible commodities.

(Slip op. at 35-36)

The majority went on to reject Texas’ other arguments. The state insisted that the Court invalidate only specific applications of H.B. 2 rather than the provisions on their face; Justice Breyer’s response was that the record in the case was so strong and showed such a statewide impact that there was essentially no application of the law that could survive. The provisions were facially invalid despite the state’s protest about the need for a more surgical remedy.

Texas also insisted that the Court go element by element through the ambulatory surgical center rule to identify which particular elements crossed the line and which could survive. To this argument Justice Breyer made clear that the surgical center standard was intended to operate as a whole as an “integrated” standard and that, therefore, no parsing was necessary. The state also attempted to argue that past decisions by the Court have upheld surgical center requirements for second trimester abortions (Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983)), but Justice Breyer noted that here the state had restricted all abortions, not only those occurring later in pregnancy. Justice Breyer further noted that consistent with Casey, the undue burden test must be viewed through a previability/viability lens and that the trimester approach of Roe v. Wade no longer applies.

Finally, the state argued that only a tiny number of women were affected and therefore the law created no undue burden. But, Justice Breyer responded that the state’s count was off: Whereas the state considered all women of reproductive age, the proper group was women actually seeking an abortion. It is women for whom the laws create an actual restriction whose interests are considered.

The Ginsburg Concurrence

Justice Ginsburg, one of the nation’s preeminent legal experts on gender discrimination, reiterated the extremely safe nature of abortions, particularly in relation to childbirth, as well as her amazement that anyone could really argue (or believe) that the Texas law was enacted out of concern for women’s health:

When a State severely limits access to safe and legal procedures, women in desperate circumstances may resort to unlicensed rogue practitioners, faute d mieux, at great risk to their health and safety. So long as this Court adheres to Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers laws like H.B. 2 that do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to abortion . . . cannot survive judicial inspection.

(Ginsburg concurrence, Slip op. at 2)

The Dissents

For their part, the dissenters homed in on what they viewed as procedural irregularities and a distortion of the record. In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the Court treated the case as a fundamental rights case when, in fact, the plaintiffs in the case were licensed clinics with economic interests and therefore did not qualify for the heightened scrutiny standard applied to cases brought by women themselves. (This was also true in Casey, where the Court first set forth its heightened scrutiny standard.) Justice Thomas would have barred the vicarious assertion of personal rights, noting that the Court has been “especially forgiving of third-party standing criteria for one particular category of cases: those involving the purported substantive due process right of a woman to abort her unborn child.” (Thomas dissent, Slip. op. at 4). (The Court has long recognized the ability to raise vicarious claims on behalf of individuals whose own injuries may evade review with the passage of time.)

Justice Thomas also accused the majority of “reimagin[ing]” the Casey “undue burden” standard, arguing that the majority had overstated the extent to which Casey bars states from engaging in legitimate health regulation without close judicial scrutiny and accusing the Court of getting the political result it sought by shifting to the higher review standard. Justice Thomas concluded by castigating the Court for ever having “invent[ed]” a constitutional right to abortion.

In his dissent, Justice Alito began by noting that “[t]he constitutionality of laws regulating abortion is one of the most controversial issues in American law, but this case does not require us to delve into that contentious dispute. Instead the dispositive issue here concerns a workaday question that can arise in any case no matter the subject,” (Alito dissent, slip op. at 1) namely whether the claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Rather than arguing the evidence in this case, or the merits of the Casey framework for judicial review, or whether the framework was properly followed, or even the underlying right to abortion itself, he would simply have thrown the case out.

Beyond his argument for dismissal of the claims, Justice Alito went on to dismiss the evidence in the trial record as insufficient to make out the claims of undue burden, arguing essentially that once the plaintiffs got their erroneous second day in court, they failed to carry the day with the evidence they presented. His biggest concern appeared to be with the evidence of causation or lack thereof. From Justice Alito’s perspective, laws may have passed and clinics may have closed, but the plaintiffs could show no causal link between the two, nor was there any convincing evidence that the remaining clinics could not reasonably meet the need. The lack of causation, coupled with the deference owed to states over the regulation of medical practice, tipped the results decisively, for Alito, toward a finding that the Casey test was satisfied.

For now, Casey stands. Five of the sitting Justices have affirmed the continuing validity of its approach to judicial review of legal restrictions on access to abortion. One Justice would indisputably set the test (and the underlying right) aside, while the remaining two clearly are inclined in that direction, although a bit more ambiguous in how they make their case. And once again we are reminded that there is no stronger poster child than abortion for the proposition that Presidential elections—that bring with them the right to recommend individuals for appointment to the federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court—matter.



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Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cones

Cupcake Liner Ice Cream

We love ice cream  so much! We love to make it, buy it, eat it, play with it, and of course craft  it. Shared below is an easy ice cream craft for kids, Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cones. Kids of all ages will enjoy using vibrant cupcake liners to create one-of-a-kind ice cream art!

cupcake liner cones

Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cone Craft

This craft is great for home, school, or camp. Perhaps just like real ice cream, the best part is topping off the cupcake liner ice cream with colorful sprinkles. My kids couldn't help but eat a few while they worked!

Materials and Supplies:

  • Cupcake liners
  • Construction paper
  • Glue
  • Brown/beige construction paper
  • Brown crayon
  • Sprinkles/Chocolate Jimmies
  • Scissors

Related: If your kids love to "play" with their ice cream, they may enjoy this Melted Ice Cream Playdough.

Ice Cream Cupcake Liner Craft

After gathering your supplies, use the brown crayon to draw a triangle on the brown/beige construction paper. Use the scissors to cut it out.

Flatten a cupcake liner, then glue both the triangle and cupcake liner onto a piece of construction paper as shown below.

Ice Cream Cone Cupcake Liner Craft

Squirt a blob of glue into the middle of the cupcake liner. Show kids how to use their finger to smear the glue around the entire cupcake liner.

After the kids have cleaned their fingers, allow them to decorate their cupcake liner ice cream cone with sprinkles or chocolate jimmies! When the cupcake liner ice cream cone is dry, use the brown crayon to draw waffle lines on the ice cream cone.

Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cone

Allow the art work to dry completely before hanging or giving away to Grandma! Then celebrate a job well done with a frozen treat!

Ice Cream Craft for Kids

Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cones

The post Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cones appeared first on Kids Activities Blog.



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Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cones

Cupcake Liner Ice Cream

We love ice cream  so much! We love to make it, buy it, eat it, play with it, and of course craft  it. Shared below is an easy ice cream craft for kids, Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cones. Kids of all ages will enjoy using vibrant cupcake liners to create one-of-a-kind ice cream art!

cupcake liner cones

Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cone Craft

This craft is great for home, school, or camp. Perhaps just like real ice cream, the best part is topping off the cupcake liner ice cream with colorful sprinkles. My kids couldn’t help but eat a few while they worked!

Materials and Supplies:

  • Cupcake liners
  • Construction paper
  • Glue
  • Brown/beige construction paper
  • Brown crayon
  • Sprinkles/Chocolate Jimmies
  • Scissors

Related: If your kids love to “play” with their ice cream, they may enjoy this Melted Ice Cream Playdough.

Ice Cream Cupcake Liner Craft

After gathering your supplies, use the brown crayon to draw a triangle on the brown/beige construction paper. Use the scissors to cut it out.

Flatten a cupcake liner, then glue both the triangle and cupcake liner onto a piece of construction paper as shown below.

Ice Cream Cone Cupcake Liner Craft

Squirt a blob of glue into the middle of the cupcake liner. Show kids how to use their finger to smear the glue around the entire cupcake liner.

After the kids have cleaned their fingers, allow them to decorate their cupcake liner ice cream cone with sprinkles or chocolate jimmies! When the cupcake liner ice cream cone is dry, use the brown crayon to draw waffle lines on the ice cream cone.

Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cone

Allow the art work to dry completely before hanging or giving away to Grandma! Then celebrate a job well done with a frozen treat!

Ice Cream Craft for Kids

Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cones

The post Cupcake Liner Ice Cream Cones appeared first on Kids Activities Blog.



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5 Fun Food Ideas with Cones

5 Breakfasts That Will Make You Love Mornings

What screams summer more than ice cream? And what goes best with ice cream? Cones, of course! Today on Family Food Live with Holly & Chris we are showing you 5 Fun Food Ideas with Cones! You will be amazed at how much fun you can have with cones!

Family Food Live with Holly & Chris can be seen today LIVE at 12 Noon CST on the Burnt Macaroni Facebook page.

5 Fun Food Ideas with Cones

Cake Cones

Shopping List:

  • 1 box Cake Mix + Box Ingredients
  • 24 Cake Ice Cream Cones
  • Cake Frosting
  • Sprinkles

Instructions:

  • Preheat oven to 350 degrees
  • Follow instructions for cake mix and mix ahead of time
  • Put ice cream cones in a cupcake tin
  • Fill cones half way up with cake batter
  • Bake about 20-23 minutes or until toothpick comes out clean
  • Allow to cool
  • Add cake frosting on top
  • Sprinkle with topping of choice
  • Serve

Chocolate Dipped Cones

Shopping List:

  • 2 cups Semi-Sweet Chocolate Chips
  • Sugar Cones
  • Vanilla and Chocolate Ice Cream
  • Sprinkles
  • Shredded Coconut

Instructions:

  • Using a microwave safe container, heat up the 2 cups of chocolate chips for about 45 seconds
  • Pour into a smaller bowl
  • Dip the top of the cone in the chocolate
  • Add sprinkles or shredded coconut to chocolate before it cools
  • Let the cones cool before adding the ice cream
  • Serve

Yogurt Cupcake Cones

Shopping List:

  • Vanilla Yogurt
  • Raspberries
  • Blackberries
  • Strawberries, cut into quarters
  • Waffle Ice Cream Cones

Instructions:

  • Prepare the strawberries and blueberries
  • Add a scoop of vanilla yogurt in the cone
  • Add some fruit, and another scoop of yogurt
  • Add a top layer of fruit
  • Put cones in freezer for no more than 1 hour to chill

Fruit Ice Cream Cones

Shopping List:

  • Cool Whip
  • Strawberries, cut in half
  • Blueberries
  • Ice Cream Cones

Instructions:

  • Combine the cool whip, strawberries & blueberries
  • Scoop the fruit mixture into the cones
  • Add sprinkles or more fruit to the top
  • Put in the freezer for 15-20 minutes to chill
  • Serve

Homemade Snow Cones

Shopping List:

  • 2 cups of Sugar
  • 1 cup of Water
  • 1 package of Unsweetened drink mix
  • Crushed Ice

Instructions

  • In a medium saucepan, stir together the sugar and water, bring to a boil until the sugar is dissolved
  • Remove from heat and stir in unsweetened drink mix
  • Allow to cool and transfer to a pouring container
  • Add to crushed ice
  • Serve

Join Family Food Live with Holly & Chris every Wednesday and Friday at Noon CST on the Quirky Momma Facebook page.

Here are a few of our favorite products from Family Food Live (affiliate links)

The post 5 Fun Food Ideas with Cones appeared first on Kids Activities Blog.



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5 Fun Food Ideas with Cones

5 Breakfasts That Will Make You Love Mornings

What screams summer more than ice cream? And what goes best with ice cream? Cones, of course! Today on Family Food Live with Holly & Chris we are showing you 5 Fun Food Ideas with Cones! You will be amazed at how much fun you can have with cones!

Family Food Live with Holly & Chris can be seen today LIVE at 12 Noon CST on the Burnt Macaroni Facebook page.

5 Fun Food Ideas with Cones

Cake Cones

Shopping List:

  • 1 box Cake Mix + Box Ingredients
  • 24 Cake Ice Cream Cones
  • Cake Frosting
  • Sprinkles

Instructions:

  • Preheat oven to 350 degrees
  • Follow instructions for cake mix and mix ahead of time
  • Put ice cream cones in a cupcake tin
  • Fill cones half way up with cake batter
  • Bake about 20-23 minutes or until toothpick comes out clean
  • Allow to cool
  • Add cake frosting on top
  • Sprinkle with topping of choice
  • Serve

Chocolate Dipped Cones

Shopping List:

  • 2 cups Semi-Sweet Chocolate Chips
  • Sugar Cones
  • Vanilla and Chocolate Ice Cream
  • Sprinkles
  • Shredded Coconut

Instructions:

  • Using a microwave safe container, heat up the 2 cups of chocolate chips for about 45 seconds
  • Pour into a smaller bowl
  • Dip the top of the cone in the chocolate
  • Add sprinkles or shredded coconut to chocolate before it cools
  • Let the cones cool before adding the ice cream
  • Serve

Yogurt Cupcake Cones

Shopping List:

  • Vanilla Yogurt
  • Raspberries
  • Blackberries
  • Strawberries, cut into quarters
  • Waffle Ice Cream Cones

Instructions:

  • Prepare the strawberries and blueberries
  • Add a scoop of vanilla yogurt in the cone
  • Add some fruit, and another scoop of yogurt
  • Add a top layer of fruit
  • Put cones in freezer for no more than 1 hour to chill

Fruit Ice Cream Cones

Shopping List:

  • Cool Whip
  • Strawberries, cut in half
  • Blueberries
  • Ice Cream Cones

Instructions:

  • Combine the cool whip, strawberries & blueberries
  • Scoop the fruit mixture into the cones
  • Add sprinkles or more fruit to the top
  • Put in the freezer for 15-20 minutes to chill
  • Serve

Homemade Snow Cones

Shopping List:

  • 2 cups of Sugar
  • 1 cup of Water
  • 1 package of Unsweetened drink mix
  • Crushed Ice

Instructions

  • In a medium saucepan, stir together the sugar and water, bring to a boil until the sugar is dissolved
  • Remove from heat and stir in unsweetened drink mix
  • Allow to cool and transfer to a pouring container
  • Add to crushed ice
  • Serve

Join Family Food Live with Holly & Chris every Wednesday and Friday at Noon CST on the Quirky Momma Facebook page.

Here are a few of our favorite products from Family Food Live (affiliate links)

The post 5 Fun Food Ideas with Cones appeared first on Kids Activities Blog.



from Kids Activities Blog http://ift.tt/29guV7V